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The article disscuss political, social, economic and demographic consequences of the 
Ottoman attacks on the Croatian territories during the second half of the 15th century. 
It also presents how Ottoman threat influenced the mentalities and everyday life of 
the Croatian population. The article claims that the Ottoman threat presented a major 
external influence on the Croatian medieval society of that period. Complex changes 
in all spheres of the Croatian society were all influenced by the threat from the east. 
Croatian history in the second half of the fifteenth century is marked by the arrival of the 
Ottomans on the borders of Croatian medieval lands. After sporadic incursions in the first half 
of the century, attackers from the east, particularly after conquering the medieval kingdom of 
Bosnia in 1463, became a factor of utmost importance for all the segments of late medieval 
Croatian society. This paper outlines the various Ottoman influences on politics, society, eco-
nomy and demographics of medieval Croatia as well as their expressions in the thinking and 
everyday life of Croatians at the time.
Living on the Ottoman border at that time was not unusual in the region. Medieval Croatia 
became the battlefield of two worlds and was a part of the periphery of the Catholic world 
in Central and Southeast Europe, which extended roughly from the Baltic to the Adriatic and 
the Black Sea regions. This area included the war-torn southern, border area of the medieval 
Hungarian-Croatian kingdom. Until the end of the fifteenth century war on both sides was 
aimed more at draining out the resources of the adversaries than at territorial conquests. Ho-
wever, only the Ottomans, even in such circumstances, managed to achieve certain territorial 
gains, conquering Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Zeta (Montenegro) and the southeastern border 
regions of medieval Croatia during the second half of the fifteenth century. 
The consequences of war were similar throughout the region. The devastation and destruction 
of the border area between the Ottomans and the neighboring states in Central and Southeast 
Europe were coupled with a decline of the economic and demographic potential on the Chri-
stian side. All this resulted in the beginning of migrations towards safer areas. The way of life 
in the wider region became more and more similar, marked with the constant threat of war. 
Agriculture was neglected and a network of fortresses, serving as local and regional centers 
of defense, gradually took its shape. The peasants were forced to change their sedentary way 
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of life, based on agriculture, to a military one. Religious solidarity, based on the threat from 
the infidels like during the Crusades, regained its relevance in the whole region. It was the 
opposite in Western Europe at the time, where the ideology of the Crusades and its system of 
values no longer played a significant mobilizing or integrative role. However, the revived ideo-
logy in a new form played a crucial role in the thinking of the social elites in the border areas, 
including medieval Croatia. The central notion of that ideology is expressed in the term “fore-
front of Christianity” (antemurale christianitatis). The social elites of almost all the countries 
in Southeast Europe, on the Ottoman frontiers, identified with this term. The papal chancery, 
in its letters to the rulers and magnates of the region, often used this notion, mainly as a sort 
of spiritual backing and compensation for the lack of real support in soldiers, money and war 
equipment from the rest of Europe.
The Ottoman influences on political, social, economic and demographic changes in medieval 
Croatia were not apparent until the year 1463. Their role became more important from then 
onwards, at the beginning mainly because of more frequent incursions and raids. The Otto-
mans once again used their efficient tactics to pave the way for territorial conquests in the 
future. From the Ottoman point of view, it was necessary to weaken their adversaries econo-
mically and demographically to make them an easy prey for the final blow.1 In the case of me-
dieval Croatia the territorial conquests mainly took place from 1521 onwards. Newer research 
points to the possible influence of food shortages at the end of the fifteenth century, caused 
by poor weather conditions, as driving forces behind some of the Ottoman raids. There were 
also the initiatives of local Ottoman commanders and border units.2 The Ottoman raids were 
swift and cruel, giving the population of the attacked regions, particularly the peasants, very 
little time and chance of finding a safe haven. The Ottoman marauding troops, because of their 
strategy and tactics, usually did not come back again for booty in the same area. Therefore, 
they always attempted to cause as much damage as possible and capture as many prisoners 
as possibly during the first major attack.3
Some regions of medieval Croatia were an integral part of the western flank of the defense 
system on the southern borders of the Hungarian-Croatian kingdom. Two defense lines of 
fortresses spread from the present-day Romanian Banat and Danube regions (Turnu-Severin 
and Timioara) in the east to the Croatian Adriatic coast near Skradin and Klis, or Senj (Zengg, 
Senia) in the west. The defense system started to take its shape soon after the Ottoman conq-
uest of medieval Bosnia in 1463, when Hungarian-Croatian king Matthias Corvinus (1458-1490) 
managed in a counterattack to liberate a significant portion of the conquered territory. The 
king established two military defense organizations, under the titles of banats of Jajce and Sre-
brnik (today in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Later, in 1469, the king went on to form a military and 
administrative unit called a captaincy, with its center in the Croatian coastal town of Senj, at 
the western terminus of the defense system. This system was centralized, poorly coordinated 
and insufficiently financed. However, during the period in question it was efficient enough and 
managed to slow down the Ottoman advance into the heart of Europe for several decades. This 
could be interpreted as one of the crucial facts for the final outcome of the Ottoman conquests. 
1 Historija naroda Jugoslavije [=History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia], (eds.  Bogo Grafenauer / Duπan PeroviÊ / 
Jaroslav ©idak), vol. 1., Zagreb 1953., 345. ; Milan KRUHEK, Krajiπke utvrde i obrana hrvatskog kraljevstva tijekom 
16. stoljeÊa [=The Fortresses of Military Krajina and the Defense of the Croatian Kingdom during the Sixteenth 
Century], Zagreb 1995., 58.
2 Ivan JURKOVI∆, The Fate of Refugees in Medieval Croatia during the Ottoman Invasion (M.A. Thesis, unpubli-
shed), Budapest 1995., passim.
3 János M. BAK, “Delinquent Lords and Forsaken Serfs: Thoughts on War and Society during the Crisis of Feuda-
lism”, Society in Change. Studies in Honor of Béla K. Király, (eds. Steven Bela Vardy / Agnes Huszar), New York 
1983., 296.
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Two parallel lines of fortresses formed the defense system, of which the rear line was some 
one hundred kilometers north of the frontline and as well having fewer fortresses. A chain of 
similar fortresses continued in the coastal area under Venetian rule. The fortresses of Knin, 
Klis and Skradin, in the territory of medieval Croatia, were part of the frontline of defense, whi-
le Krupa and BihaÊ (in the present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina), as well as OtoËac and Senj, 
were part of a rear line. Apart from the royal ones, the fortresses of various magnate families 
in Croatia constituted the main and irreplaceable part of the defense network.4
Contingents of border units filled up the empty spaces between the two lines of fortresses. 
They were mainly banderia of various Croatian nobles. All the various defense units, including 
peasants defending their own homes, were put under the central command of the king, who 
in turn, partly or fully, financed the defense system from the state income.5 The financing and 
command over the entire defense system gradually became centralized from the 1460’s onw-
ards. For the first time in 1466 the functions of bans (bani) of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia 
were temporarily united in one person, to meet the military needs. The new and common ban 
became the commander who united the whole western flank of the defense system. Various se-
ctors of defense had their own smaller units as well, with their local territorial commanders in 
charge of the more important fortresses. They worked together with mobile and independent 
units under direct royal command. In medieval Croatia the infantry significantly outnumbered 
the cavalry, for both financial reasons and the mountainous character of the local terrain.6
The defense system for the most part fulfilled its objectives till the end of the fifteenth century. 
Occasional skirmishes on the border and incursions into the enemy’s hinterland, on both sides, 
including even bigger battles such as one fought at the Krbava field in Croatia in 1493, did not 
significantly alter the balance of power. However, the balance of power gradually started to 
alter towards the end of the century, in favor of the Ottomans, particularly after the death of 
Matthias Corvinus in 1490. The defense system required more and more material and human 
sacrifices, while at the same time the overall number of taxpayers and the resources of the 
Hungarian-Croatian kingdom started to decline.7 The Ottomans were generally superior in lo-
gistics, the number of canons, the firepower of artillery and particularly in the maintenance of 
arms and equipment. The use of artillery gradually but substantially changed the very nature 
of war. The Ottoman supremacy in artillery at the beginning of the sixteenth century became 
very important for besieging the fortified strongholds. Therefore, the defenders were forced to 
build much larger and safer fortresses.8 Unfortunately for the Croats, their resources were not 
sufficient to do that.
4 Historija naroda Jugoslavije, 754.-755. ; Karl NEHRING, Matthias Corvinus, Kaiser Friedrich III und das Reich. 
Zum hunyadisch-habsburgischen Gegensatz in Donauraum, München 1975., 13.-27. ; Ferenc SZAKÁLY, “Phases 
of Turco-Hungarian Warfare before the Battle of Mohács”, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 
33/1979., 99.-100. ; F. SZAKÁLY, “The Hungarian-Croatian Border Defense System and its Collapse”, From Hunyadi 
to Rákóczi. War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary, (eds. János M. Bak / Béla K. Király), 
Brooklyn 1982., 142.-143. ; Vasko SIMONITI, Turki so v deæeli æe: turπki vpadi na slovensko ozemlje v 15. in 16. 
stoletju [=The Turks are Already in the Country: Turkish Incursions into Slovenian Territory in the Fifteenth and 
the Sixteenth Centuries], Celje 1990., 203.-205.
5 F. SZAKÁLY, “The Hungarian-Croatian Border Defense System”, 143., 145.
6 Ibidem, 146.-147.
7 Ibidem, 148.-150. ; F. SZAKÁLY, “Phases of Turco-Hungarian Warfare”, 111. ; Tomislav RAUKAR, “Druπtveni razvoj 
u Hrvatskoj u XV stoljeÊu” [=Social Development in Croatia in the Fifteenth Century], Historijski zbornik (further: 
HZ),  38/1985., 80.-81.
8 The development of artillery and fortifications at the end of the fifteenth and at the beginning of the sixteenth 
centuries in a wider European context is discussed in Matthew Smith ANDERSON, The Origins of the Modern 
European State System 1494-1618,  New York 1998., 17.-24.
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The growth of Ottoman threat after 1463 had direct consequences on the organization of the 
anti-Ottoman defense in the Croatian lands. Namely, it led to some organizational changes 
with direct political repercussions that sped up the process of political integration of medie-
val Slavonia with medieval Croatia. Until the year 1463 two separate bans administered the 
two kingdoms in the name of the king in Buda. From 1463 till 1476 the two functions were 
sometimes unified in one person, while from August 1476 onwards the kingdoms of Dalmatia, 
Croatia and Slavonia were placed under the control of one common ban. The military and 
defense needs brought about this change. The military function of the ban became more and 
more important, because he took the leading role in the defense against the Ottomans on the 
western flank of the defense system. As more power and authority was vested in him, the ban’s 
prestige and rank increased. Simultaneously, the status of the three Croatian kingdoms inside 
the realm improved as well.9
Closer ties among the medieval Croatian lands and the first migrations of Croats from the 
south to the north were coupled with a gradual expansion of term Croatia, in political sense, 
onto the neighboring regions of medieval Slavonia. In the second half of the fifteenth and the 
first half of the sixteenth centuries, for example, some parts of Zagreb County, south of the 
rivers Kupa and Sava (the former counties of Gorica and Gora) started to be referred to as 
Croatia. The whole territory in the area of the rivers Kupa, Sava and Una from then onwards 
became an integral part of medieval Croatia, with its towns and fortresses such as BihaÊ, 
Krupa, Kostajnica, Zrin, Toplica (Topusko), SteniËnjak and Dubovac, all earlier in medieval 
Slavonia. Many refugees from the south both nobles and commoners settled throughout the 
region during this period.10
Apart from the cavalry units of the Croatian bans and magnates, the middle and lesser Croa-
tian nobility represented the most numerous and a very important component of the defense. 
However, their fighting capability did not always correspond with the fact that they were the 
most numerous. They were bound to their possessions and would gather in arms after being 
called upon by their counts or counts’ officials. This type of mobilizing, in essence typically 
medieval, as compared to the Ottoman raiding units, made them inefficient and slow. The 
Croatian nobles usually managed to attack the Ottomans only during the latter’s return from 
robbing the Holy Roman Empire or the Venetian-held territories, when the conquerors were 
loaded with booty and prisoners of war and therefore much slower and more vulnerable. The 
biggest defects of the Croatian defense units were exactly the above-mentioned slowness, 
poor tactics and strategy of the outdated system, typical of the medieval rural and sedentary 
Croatian society.11
The natural and geographical features of medieval Croatia hindered its defense efforts as well. 
As opposed to medieval Slavonia, protected by natural obstacles such as the Sava and Danu-
be rivers, medieval Croatian territory was easily accessible to the Ottoman raiding units and 
therefore attractive for plundering. Mountains and forests of medieval Croatia represented a 
perfect cover for the Ottoman looters, enabling them to remain for a longer period of time on 
the Croatian soil, waging a sort of guerilla war. By doing so they represented a constant ele-
9 Vjekoslav KLAI∆, “Hrvatsko kraljevstvo u XV. stoljeÊu i prvoj Ëetvrti XVI. stoljeÊa” [=The Kingdom of Croatia in the 
Fifteenth and the First Quarter of the Sixteenth Centuries], Vjesnik hrvatskoga arheoloπkoga druπtva u Zagrebu 
n. s. (further: VHAD), 8/1905., 135.-136. ; Mirko VALENTI∆, “Hrvati u stogodiπnjem ratu” [=Croats in a Century of 
War], SisaËka bitka 1593., (eds. Ivo Goldstein / Milan Kruhek), Zagreb - Sisak 1994., 20., n. 2.
10 V. KLAI∆, “Hrvatsko kraljevstvo”, 133.
11 The claims in this passage and the following one follow the well-argued interpretations of Ivan JurkoviÊ. I am 
grateful to him for his manuscript, which will be a part of his Ph.D. Thesis entitled The Fate of the Croatian Lower 
Nobility during the Ottoman Invasion, at the Central European University in Budapest.
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ment of insecurity and instability for all Croatian social groups. There was true devastation as 
a consequence of their activities. The defenders would fight them only when the Ottoman units 
were retreating, when the damage had already been done. Even then the Croats seldom mana-
ged to prevent the Ottomans from returning home safely.12 The fact that the Ottomans, from the 
beginning of the sixteenth century onwards, held strategically important fortresses in the Sana 
River valley, Kamengrad and KljuË, inserted in-between the Croatian territory, enabled them to 
attack Croatia at will, with either smaller or larger units. The two above-mentioned fortresses 
almost completely separated the two lines of the defense system in that area.13
Considering all of the above, especially the outdated style of waging war, one could argue that 
the Croatian defense system, which relied upon various types of fortresses and natural featu-
res of the terrain, represented one of the weaker links in the chain, although the defenders did 
not lack courage and fighting spirit.14
From the year 1463 the Ottomans started with their incursions into Croatia, through the regi-
ons lying on the main routes towards the Adriatic coast and the provinces of Lower Austria, 
namely through Lika, Gacka and Krbava regions, the area around the town of Modruπ as well 
as the hinterland of Venetian-held Dalmatian towns. Particularly badly hit were the areas of 
the most powerful Croatian magnates, the estates of the Frankapani and KurjakoviÊi families. 
The leading Croatian magnates remained, till the end of the fifteenth century, without nume-
rous important possessions, which significantly reduced their overall power. This reduction 
was due to Ottoman raids, political and territorial aspirations of the Holy Roman Empire and 
Venice, and particularly King Matthias’s centralizing measures. The most weakened were the 
Frankapani, who lost Senj, part of the Vinodol County and the island of Krk (Veglia). By loosing 
them they were deprived of their coastal and most valuable possessions. Therefore, even their 
remaining estates, in economic as well as in military and strategic terms, significantly declined 
in value.15 The Croatian social elite was once again badly hit in their defeat by the Ottomans 
at the Krbava field in 1493, loosing in a single day a huge number of its members, although 
its consequences on medieval Croatia were not immediately felt.16 Despite several significant 
military victories up to the end of the fifteenth century, such as conquering Herzegovina in 
1482 and winning the Krbava battle, the Ottomans did not significantly undermine the territo-
12 The main Ottoman incursions into medieval Croatia came from the fortresses of Kamengrad and KljuË (in the 
present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina) across Krupa and the Korana River towards Metlika (in the present-day 
Slovenia) and further to Ljubljana (Laibach), as well as across the Lika region, towards Rijeka (Fiume) and further 
to Istria and Kras (Carso) regions. Danilo KLEN, “StoljeÊe i pol prilika i neprilika u Rijeci i oko nje (1465-1627)” 
[=A Century and a Half of Events and Troubles in Rijeka and Its Vicinity (1465-1627)], HZ, 41/1988., 18.
13 Historija naroda Jugoslavije, 754.-755. See also M. VALENTI∆, “Hrvati u stogodiπnjem ratu”, 20. ; Nenad MOA»A-
NIN, “BihaÊ i osmanski obrambeni sustav na sjeverozapadu Bosanskog ejaleta 1592.-1711.” [=The Town of BihaÊ 
and the Ottoman Defense System in the Northwestern Part of the Bosnian Eyalet 1592-1711], Spomenica Ljube 
Bobana, (ed. Mira Kolar DimitrijeviÊ), Zagreb 1996., 105.-107.
14 For typology and the names of the Croatian fortresses see M. KRUHEK, Krajiπke utvrde, 11.-39., with the list of 
relevant literature.
15 The complex relations between the Frankapani counts and King Matthias are amply discussed in Vjekoslav 
KLAI∆, KrËki knezovi Frankapani. Od najstarijih vremena do gubitka otoka Krka [=The Frankapani Counts of 
Krk from the Earliest Period until the Loss of the Island of Krk], vol. 1., Zagreb 1901. ; Borislav GRGIN, The Fran-
kapani Family and King Matthias Corvinus (M.A. Thesis, unpublished), Budapest 1994. ; B. GRGIN, “Senj i Vinodol 
izmeu kralja Matijaπa Korvina, Frankapana i Venecije” [=Senj and Vinodol among King Matthias Corvinus, the 
Frankapani Family and Venice], Radovi Zavoda za hrvatsku povijest, 28/1995., 61.-70. ; B. GRGIN, Kralj Matijaπ 
Korvin i Hrvatska [=King Matthias Corvinus and Croatia] (Dr.Phil. Thesis, unpublished), Zagreb 1997., 115.-206.
16 Krbavska bitka i njezine posljedice [=The Battle of Krbava Field and Its Consequences], (ed. Dragutin PavliËeviÊ), 
Zagreb 1997., passim.
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rial integrity of medieval Croatia. However, they managed to conquer some border areas of the 
kingdom and to weaken its economic and demographic capacities.
Relevant sources confirm the Ottoman raids on the estates of the Frankapani and KurjakoviÊi 
families in June 1463. In the summer of 1464 the estates of Count Stjepan (Steven) Frankapan 
were hit, and the Ottomans captured many inhabitants of the region.17 A period of intensive 
incursions started in the summer of 1467, with the Ottomans coming all the way down to the 
hinterland of Venetian-held Dalmatian towns of Zadar (Zara) and ©ibenik (Sebenico).18 The 
new attack came at the beginning of 1468, with the Ottomans coming down from Bosnia as far 
as Senj. The Frankapani family estates were once again badly hit, while the Ottomans on their 
return sacked the town of Modruπ, capturing many of its inhabitants.19 The Ottoman incursion 
in April or May 1469 was particularly devastating. They penetrated once again as far as Senj, 
forcing the Frankapani to pay a significant sum of money for the town to be spared. The town 
of Modruπ and the imperial province of Carniola were plundered as well. The Ottomans took 
many prisoners of war and large amounts of booty back to Bosnia. The Venetians were the 
only ones who effectively helped the Croatian magnates in such dire circumstances, sending 
a hundred infantry troops to Count Stjepan Frankapan for the defense of the town of Modruπ. 
The next Ottoman raid occurred in September 1469.20
While King Matthias was busy waging war in Bohemia, the Croatian magnates had to find 
their own solutions for preventing the aggressors’ attacks, which created a real confusion 
during the years 1468 and 1469. The defense strategies were various, expressing all the chaos, 
uncertainty and fears. They varied from petitions for help in men, arms and money addressed 
to the various neighboring states, calls for a military alliance with Venice, to migration tow-
ards the safer areas (for example Count Martin Frankapan).21 The Ottoman raids continued 
to be frequent and devastating. They plundered the hinterland of the Dalmatian towns of 
Zadar, ©ibenik and Split (Spalato) in May 1471.22 The raids were particularly frequent in 1472, 
when the Ottomans attacked in May, September and again in November. As a consequence 
of this mounting pressure on medieval Croatia, Pope Sixtus IV, King Ferrante of Naples and 
the Venetians launched an international diplomatic action to help Croatia.23 Even while the 
Croatian estates asked for foreign help, the leading Croatian magnates continued their internal 
conflicts. The international mediators emphasized those conflicts as being the principal cause 
of difficulties that medieval Croatia was facing at the time.
Besides the Ottoman superiority in military terms, one can safely suppose that the tumultuous 
internal relations among the various strata of Croatian late medieval society further facilitated 
17 Iván NAGY / Albert NYÁRY, Magyar diplomacziai emlekek. Mátyás király korából [=Hungarian Diplomatic 
Sources from the Period of King Matthias], vol. 1., Budapest 1875., 218.-219., 284.-288. ; V. KLAI∆, KrËki knezovi 
Frankapani, 251.
18 I. NAGY / A. NYÁRY, Magyar diplomacziai emlekek, vol. 2., Budapest 1877., 67.-68.
19 Ibidem, 75.-76.
20 Ibidem, 117.-119., 122., 126.-129., 132.-133. ; ©ime LJUBI∆, Listine o odnoπajih Juænoga Slavenstva i MletaËke Repu-
blike [=Documents Concerning the Relations of the Southern Slavs with the Republic of Venice], vol. 10., Zagreb 
1891., (Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium, vol. 22.), 447., 453.-454. ; V. KLAI∆, KrËki knezovi 
Frankapani, 258.
21 I. NAGY / A. NYÁRY, Magyar diplomacziai emlekek, vol. 2., 96.-98. ; ©. LJUBI∆, Listine, 430.-431., 434.-435. ; V. 
KLAI∆, KrËki knezovi Frankapani, 257. ; Vjekoslav KLAI∆, Povijest Hrvata [=The History of Croats], vol. 4., Zagreb 
1980., 99. ; János M. BAK, “The Late Medieval Period 1382-1526”, History of Hungary, (eds. Peter F. Sugar / Péter 
Hanák / Tibor Frank), Bloomington 1990., 72.
22 I. NAGY / A. NYÁRY, Magyar diplomacziai emlekek, vol. 2., 216.-217.
23 V. KLAI∆, Povijest Hrvata, 115.-116.
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Ottoman incursions into Croatia and Slavonia. Such an unstable internal situation was by no 
means unusual throughout Europe during the Middle Ages. However, in a radically changed 
international framework, it became an important obstacle for the efficient defense of medieval 
Croatian lands. Numerous examples from both Croatia and even more so from Slavonia during 
this period illustrate the fact that the Ottoman threat did not prevent internal fights.24 The con-
flicts among the Croatian magnates were of particular relevance. Count Petar (Peter) Zrinski, 
for example, in 1475 imprisoned and robbed Count Ivan (John) KarloviÊ KurjakoviÊ of Krbava. 
This move prompted swift reaction and condemnation by the Zagreb County noble diet. They 
soon forced Count Petar to liberate Count Ivan and restitute all his belongings.25
In the fall of both 1473 and 1474 Croatia and Slavonia, as well as the neighboring provinces 
of the Empire, were once again badly hit.26 The frequent Ottoman incursions forced Emperor 
Frederick III and the estates of Carniola, Carinthia and Styria to consider the creation of a 
frontline network of strong defense fortresses. The latter had to extend even on the other side 
of the empire’s borders, on Croatian soil. At the same time Venice was also interested in the 
creation of what would later become a Militaergraenz of the Habsburg Empire. Medieval Cro-
atia would serve, in their minds, as a convenient buffer zone or frontline for the upkeep and 
defense of the Venetian-held province of Friuli.27 King Matthias was not opposed in principle 
to the above-mentioned ideas, as long as the new defense system remained under his control. 
He also believed his Croatian neighbors, as an interested party, should finance its upkeep.28
While the international plans for the anti-Ottoman defense were slowly taking shape, the 
invaders did not wait. They crossed the Una River (on the Croatian-Bosnian border) in 1475, 
plundering the vicinity around the fortress of Zrin. Their incursion led them further into Lower 
Austria. On their retreat, near the Una River, they suffered a defeat by the troops of Count 
Petar Zrinski.29 The Ottomans launched a new wave of attacks after the death of Hungarian 
appointed Bosnian king Nikola IloËki (Nicholas of Ilok, Miklós Újlaki) in 1477. Croatia and 
Slavonia were plundered in October of the same year. This attack prompted the Frankapani 
and the KurjakoviÊi to beg for help from Venice. The Venetian authorities refused their appeal, 
putting the blame for the sad course of events directly on the counts and their internal fights.30
King Matthias was at the same time residing in Korneuburg, engaged in a conflict against Em-
peror Frederick III and unable to help the Croatian counts. Therefore, he summoned the bans 
of Slavonia and Croatia for consultations, after they had complained about the Ottoman raids. 
The king approved the assembly of the Slavonian noble diet, aimed at evaluating the defense 
potential of the realm and electing a special captain to take care of the defense preparations 
and needs. The king’s measures were coupled with a four year long exemption from taxes for 
Slavonia, in order to facilitate the defense efforts.31
24 Magyar Országos Leveltár, Budapest - Diplomatikai Leveltár [=The Hungarian State Archives in Budapest - 
Archive of pre-1526 Charters] (further: MOL - DL), nos. 106840, 106846, 106850, 106852, 106856, 107006, 107011, 
107021, 107025, 107027, 107028, 107030, 107035, 107048, 107054, 107056, 107058, 107059, 107060, 107061, 107088.
25 Ivan KUKULJEVI∆ SAKCINSKI, Zrin grad i njegovi gospodari [=The Fortress of Zrin and Its Masters], Zagreb 
1883., 47.-48.
26 V. KLAI∆, Povijest Hrvata, 117.-119. ; I. NAGY / A. NYÁRY, Magyar diplomacziai emlekek, vol. 2., 260.-261.
27 Fabio CUSIN, Il confine orientale d’Italia nella politica europea del XIV e XV secolo, Trieste 1977., 422., 424.-427.
28 According to Nehring, it was King Matthias’s firm belief that Emperor Frederick III was morally obliged to finance 
the new system. The king held him responsible for their conflict in Bohemia, where the Christian forces were 
mutually destroyed in vain. K. NEHRING, Matthias Corvinus, 77.
29 I. KUKULJEVI∆ SAKCINSKI, Zrin grad, 47.
30 V. KLAI∆, Povijest Hrvata, 133.
31 József TELEKI, Hunyadiak kora Magyarországon [=The Age of the Hunyadi in Hungary], vol. 12., Pest 1857., 35.-36. 
; V. KLAI∆, Povijest Hrvata, 131.-132.
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The Ottoman raids continued in the spring of 1478. However, the Croatian magnates managed 
to defeat this Ottoman group on its retreat, somewhere on the estates of Count Petar Zrinski, 
in the summer of 1478. The Ottoman incursions into Croatia were repeated in the fall of 1479.32
Probably the biggest Croatian success in the anti-Ottoman fighting during the second half of 
the fifteenth century was a battle in the vicinity of the Una River, at the end of October 1483. 
The Croatian magnate troops, led by ban Matijaπ (Matthias, Mátyás) Gereb, inflicted a huge 
defeat on the Ottomans, who were coming back from the imperial territory overloaded with 
booty and prisoners of war.33 In the battle the Frankapani counts, particularly Count Bernardin, 
son of Count Stjepan, and the Zrinski counts distinguished themselves. A five-year long truce 
between the Ottomans and King Matthias followed the battle. It halted the fighting on a larger 
scale for some time. However, the border skirmishes continued. The Ottomans plundered the 
area of Modruπ in 1486, while in 1487 some 600 Ottoman horsemen attacked the Hungarian-
Croatian kingdom.34
After the death of King Matthias Corvinus, in 1490, the truce between the two sides ended and 
the Ottomans restarted their attacks. In 1491 they attacked Slavonia and Carniola. On their 
way back they were defeated by Croatian forces, led by Count Bernardin Frankapan, near Ko-
renica in Krbava County, in the locality of Vrpile. This defeat forced the Ottomans to halt their 
attacks during the year 1492.35 A new heavy attack started in 1493 and finished with disaster 
for the Croatian noble army at the Krbava field.36 The attacks on yearly basis continued in the 
fall of 1494, with the Ottomans besieging the town of Modruπ, but apparently without success. 
In March 1495 a three-year truce was established.37
The entire Croatian population participated in defending their own estates, possessions and 
the whole country against the Ottomans. As well, the Croatian nobility, when necessary, joined 
their king in his large-scale anti-Ottoman actions outside the borders of medieval Croatia. The 
main goal of the actions at the time was in the neighboring Ottoman Bosnia. Some of the most 
prominent Croatian magnates, such as counts and brothers Martin and Stjepan Frankapani, 
actively participated in King Matthias’s Bosnian counteroffensive in 1463-1464, together with 
their entourage of lesser nobles. Numerous other Croatian magnates and nobles from all over 
medieval Croatia took part in the action as well.38 Once again, the king’s troops attacked Bo-
snia in 1480, with a significant participation of Croatian troops. The king in his report to Pope 
Sixtus IV described the fighting in detail.39
After the creation of banats of Jajce and Srebrnik, as well as of captaincy of Senj, the fortres-
ses in medieval Croatia became the backbone of the defense system. They became the real 
centers of defense and main guarantors of security for the local population. Besides the for-
32 Ibidem, 133., 145.
33 I. NAGY / A. NYÁRY, Magyar diplomacziai emlekek, vol. 4., Budapest 1878., 363.-366. ; –uro ©URMIN, Hrvatski 
spomenici [=Acta Croatica], vol. 1., Zagreb 1898., (Monumenta historico-iuridica Slavorum meridionalium, vol. 6.), 
291. ; V. KLAI∆, Povijest Hrvata, 164.-168.
34 I. NAGY / A. NYÁRY, Magyar diplomacziai emlekek, vol. 3., Budapest 1877., 121.-123., 239.-241. ; V. KLAI∆, Povijest 
Hrvata, 168.
35 Ibidem, 225.-226.
36 Ibidem, 228.-234. See also footnote no. 16.
37 Ibidem, 239.-240.
38 Lajos THALLÓCZY / Samu BARABÁS, Codex diplomaticus comitum de Frangepanibus, vol. 2., Budapest 1913., 
(Monumenta Hungariae historica-Diplomataria, vol. 38.), 57.-60., 69.-71. ; V. KLAI∆, Povijest Hrvata, 63.-64.
39 Ibidem, 149.-151. ; Vilmos FRAKNÓI, Mathiae Corvini Hungariae Regis epistolae ad Romanos Pontifices datae et 
ab eis acceptae, Budapest 1891., (Monumenta Vaticana historiam regni Hungariae illustrantia, ser. 1., vol. 6.), 154.-
158.
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tress of Senj, the captaincy included the fortresses of Brinje, OtoËac, Starigrad and Novigrad, 
under the command of their castellani, as well as the Croatian coastal fortresses from Trsat 
(Tarsatica) till Senj. The royal troops were placed in the main fortresses and the king paid 
for their upkeep from state income.40 In the year 1489 some Slavonian and Croatian defense 
fortresses, for example Brinje, were repaired, reconstructed and better equipped. According to 
records from that time, Brinje was then listed among the middle-sized fortresses in Slavonia 
and Croatia. The strongest fortress by far on the southern borders of the Hungarian-Croatian 
kingdom was Jajce.41 All those fortresses started to serve more and more often as shelters for 
the local population. The whole country was slowly transforming into a real military camp, 
besieged behind its defense walls.
Many Croatian nobles holding exposed estates, particularly the lesser and the middle-sized 
ones, found it increasingly difficult to cope with the challenges posed by the anti-Ottoman 
defense, both in financial and military terms. One of the possible solutions to such difficult 
circumstances was to sell the endangered estates to those among their noble colleagues who 
were, at least for the time being, still willing and able to organize a proper defense. For exam-
ple, Nikola (Nicholas) Sekelj, the son of Mihovil (Michael) from Sveti Juraj, took such decision. 
In August 1473 he sold to a certain Ladislav (Ladislas) Roh de Detche the fortress of Kozara 
in Sana County (present-day northern Bosnia), for the sum of 3000 golden florins, together 
with the adjacent smaller fortresses.42 A document clearly describes the circumstances of the 
transaction. Nikola claimed that he suffered the loss of many soldiers and other members of 
his armed entourage, despite his strong efforts and the high costs of the defense. He explicitly 
stated that the danger of an Ottoman takeover was imminent, because of their attacks on an 
almost daily basis. An efficient defense would require a much larger number of soldiers and 
more supplies. Nikola could obviously no longer fulfill those conditions. Therefore, he decided 
to sell his fortresses to prevent a negative course of events, judging that the Ottoman seizure of 
his estates would seriously endanger the entire kingdom. Nikola explicitly stated, as well, that 
for some ten years he did not receive a single penny from the royal treasury for the upkeep 
of his fortresses. This claim is very indicative and significant, casting a new light on the role 
of the central authorities in the defense of the southern frontiers. It was obviously far from a 
firm, consistent and continuous policy. The decade Nikola was referring to is the period be-
tween 1463 and 1473. His claims clearly illustrate the neglect of the southern fronts, because 
of the king’s political priorities in Central Europe, after Matthias’s counteroffensive in Bosnia, 
in 1463-4.
The Croatian nobles, from 1463 onwards, gradually started to migrate towards the safer parts 
of the kingdom. This was particularly true for the nobles living on the southeastern borders of 
medieval Croatia. Their migrations intensified after the Ottoman capture of the fortress of PoËi-
telj on the Neretva River (in the present-day Herzegovina, near the town of Mostar), in 1471. Till 
the end of the fifteenth century the Ottomans conquered the whole region between the rivers 
Cetina and Neretva. For example, the most important magnates from that region, Vladislav 
40 V. KLAI∆, “Hrvatsko kraljevstvo”, 145. ; V. KLAI∆, Povijest Hrvata, 177. ; Branko KRMPOTI∆, “Maroje ÆunjeviÊ, Ve-
liki kapitan Senja (1476-1483)” [=Maroje ÆunjeviÊ, the Great Captain of Senj (1476-1483)], Senjski zbornik (further: 
SZ), 6 /1975., 307.-308.
41 András KUBINYI, Matthias Corvinus. Die Regierung eines Königreichs in Ostmitteleuropa 1458-1490., Herne 
1999., 194.
42 Lajos THALLÓCZY / Sándor HORVÁTH, Codex diplomaticus partium regno Hungariae adnexarum (comitatuum: 
Dubicza, Orbász et Szana), Budapest 1912., (Monumenta Hungariae historica-Diplomataria, vol. 36.), 208.-211.
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VukËiÊ and vojvoda Ivaniπ (John) VlatkoviÊ, moved to Slavonia.43 Many members of the KoluniÊ 
noble lineage, from the Pset County (present-day southwestern Bosnia) started to migrate after 
the Ottoman conquest of medieval Bosnia. Some of them moved further west to Lika and Ga-
cka counties, while one of the families settled in the Venetian-held Dalmatian town of ©ibenik. 
One branch of the KoluniÊ lineage moved to Styria, and the other one, at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, to southwestern Hungary.44 Some prominent members of the clergy, such as 
the Cistercians from Topusko, emigrated after the Ottoman incursion in 1463.45
The more powerful Croatian magnates, such as the Frankapani, living near the borders of 
Venice and the Empire, had other possibilities to protect their own interests and property from 
the Ottoman threat. For example, after 1463 Count Martin Frankapan stored his valuables, 
mainly silver, in the Venetian-held Dalmatian town of Rab (Arbe) on the island of the same 
name.46 In the year 1478 the brothers Martin and Anæ (John) Frankapan stored the sum of 1000 
golden ducats in Rab.47 Among the middle nobles from the same Croatian border area there 
is an interesting case of knez Lacko (Ladislas) from Kosinj and his son Juraj (George) Lacko-
viÊ. According to their title and material wealth, it is clear that they were not far behind the 
magnates. It is rather indicative that such magnates and middle nobles tried to find refuge in 
the safer areas of Dalmatia very soon after the first major Ottoman attack in 1463.48 However, 
an important difference between them should be emphasized. The Frankapani were probably 
still sure of the strength of their fortified residences. Therefore, they stored only a part of their 
property in Rab, while the above-mentioned middle nobles had already decided to transfer 
their property completely to Rab. 
Lacko and Juraj moved to the island probably around 1469, at the end of the first phase of Ot-
toman attacks. Local documents started to mention them from October 1470 onwards. Till the 
end of 1470 Lacko was involved in the maritime trade and purchasing of grain on the Italian 
coast as well as buying property in Rab. The amounts mentioned in those transactions easily 
reached hundreds of ducats.49 In February 1471 Lacko was already titled ciuis et habitator 
ciuitatis Arbi. He then paid back his debt to Ivan (John) de Dominis, a patrician from Rab, who 
loaned him some one hundred ducats while Lacko was settling on the island together with 
his property and entourage.50 Taking into account the fact that Lacko was well off materially, 
43 King Matthias donated the fortresses of Veliki Kalnik and Mali Kalnik in the Kriæevci (Körös) County as well as 
MoroviÊ in the Vuka (Valkó) County to Vladislav VukËiÊ. Ivaniπ VlatkoviÊ moved to Slavonia even earlier. Lajos 
THALLÓCZY / Samu BARABÁS, Codex diplomaticus comitum de Blagay, Budapest 1897., (Monumenta Hungariae 
historica-Diplomataria, vol. 28.), 380.-387. ; V. KLAI∆, Povijest Hrvata, 106.
44 Vjekoslav KLAI∆, “Æupanija Pset (Pesenta) i pleme KoluniÊ” [=The County of Pset (Pesenta) and the Noble Lineage 
KoluniÊ], VHAD, 15/1928., 11.-12.
45 Ivan Krstitelj TKAL»I∆, “Cistercitski samostan u Topuskom” [=Cistercian Monastery in Topusko], VHAD, 2/1897., 
129.
46 Dræavni arhiv, Zadar [=The State Archives in Zadar] (further: DAZ), Spisi rapskih biljeænika, Toma StanËiÊ (1470-
1472), b. 3., fasc. 13., pp. 38.-39.
47 Ibidem, Andrija Fajeta, b. 1., fasc. 2. 9., pp. 4.-5.
48 Dalmatian towns were at the time receiving many distinguished refugees from the broader hinterland. For ex-
ample in 1463, after the death of the last Bosnian king Stjepan (Steven) TomaπeviÊ, his brother RadiË with his 
family and belongings came to settle in Rab. After 1482 even Vlatko, the son of Chercech Stjepan VukËiÊ KosaËa 
temporarily resided in Rab and died there, in 1489. ©ime LJUBI∆, Commissiones et relationes Venetae, vol. 1., 
Zagreb 1876., (Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium, vol. 6.), 88. ; Stjepan ANTOLJAK, Izvori 
i literatura o proπlosti otoka Raba od ranoga srednjeg vijeka do godine 1797. [=Sources and Literature on the 
History of the Island of Rab from the Early Middle Ages till the Year 1797], Zadar - Rab 1986., 28.
49 DAZ, Spisi rapskih biljeænika, Toma StanËiÊ (1470-1472), b. 3., fasc. 13., pp. 16., 18.-19., 21.
50 Ibidem, p. 26.
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one could safely suppose that this debt was a result of his migration to Rab in a hurry, caused 
by extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, Lacko and his son lacked the initial capital. Ho-
wever, they easily and quickly solved the problem of debt. Documents from 1472 give further 
insight in Lacko’s strengthening of his own social status in the new community, enumerating 
his houses with real glass windows, his purchasing of pork from Italy for significant sums of 
money, etc.51
The common people found it even more difficult to cope with the challenges posed by the 
constant Ottoman threat. After 1463 they gradually started to leave their homeland, in bigger 
numbers year by year, trying to find safe havens outside medieval Croatia. The Ottoman raids 
and conquests till 1526 completely disintegrated medieval Croatian communities, changed the 
social order and led to the collapse of medieval church organization in Croatia.52 Among the 
preferred final destinations for migrations were the Venetian held Dalmatian towns, with their 
safe town walls. For example, the town of Zadar, during the second half of the fifteenth century, 
received many new settlers from the areas of medieval Croatia and Slavonia near the Bosnian 
border, particularly from the vicinity of the Una River. Many newcomers were from the counti-
es of Pset and Sana (today in western Bosnia), as well as from areas of Dreænik, Lapac, Krbava, 
Lika (all today in Croatia) KoluniÊ, Krupa and BihaÊ (today in western Bosnia). They became 
a cheap labor force in Dalmatian towns, working as domestic servants, petty craftsmen, etc.53
Besides the Dalmatian towns and islands, migrations of Croats gradually spread in an ever-
wider area, reaching from the Italian Adriatic coast,54 across Istria, present-day Slovenia and 
Hrvatsko Zagorje, to Burgenland and western Hungary.
The migrations from Senj to Marche in Italy, for example, increased 350% during the second 
half of the fifteenth century. The newcomers settled in all the major coastal towns in Marche. 
They came from the towns of Senj, Krk, Bakar (Buccari), Knin, Krbava, Ogulin, Modruπ and 
BihaÊ in Croatia, as well as Krupa, Blagaj, Zrin, Petrinja, Zagreb, Krapina and Poæega in Sla-
vonia. It is difficult to establish the exact number of settlers and the rates of immigration due 
to the paucity of sources. However, both figures were most probably significant. For example, 
in the second half of the fifteenth century it seems that about 15% of population in the town of 
Fano in Marche was of Slavonic, mainly of Croatian origin. Besides the merchants, craftsmen 
and seamen, who came to Marche looking for higher profits and more lucrative jobs, the ne-
wcomers were most probably refugees fleeing the Ottomans.55 The most important center of 
Croatian immigration on the Italian coast throughout the centuries was Venice. From the mid-
fifteenth century onwards, particularly in the last quarter of the century, a significant number 
of South Slavonic, mainly Croatian immigrants settled there. Among them the settlers from the 
Croatian towns of Modruπ and Senj represented a significant group.56
51 Ibidem, pp. 85., 93.
52 Tomislav RAUKAR, “Hrvatska na razmeu XV. i XVI. stoljeÊa” [=Croatia at the Turn of the Fifteenth and the 
Sixteenth Centuries], SZ, 17/1990., 10.-11.
53 Tomislav RAUKAR, Zadar u XV. stoljeÊu. Ekonomski razvoj i druπtveni odnosi [=The Town of Zadar in the Fifte-
enth Century. Economic Development and Social Relations], Zagreb 1977., 67. For migrations from the present-day 
Bosnia and Herzegovina compare also Franjo ©ANJEK, “Hrvati prognanici i izbjeglice kroz povijest” [=Croatian 
Displaced Persons and Refugees throughout History], Bogoslovska smotra, 63/1993., n. 3-4, 350.-355.
54 Slavonic migrations to Italy are amply discussed in Ferdo GESTRIN, “Migracije iz Dalmacije u Marke u XV i XVI 
stoljeÊu” [=Migrations from Dalmatia to Marche in the Fifteenth and the Sixteenth Centuries], Radovi Instituta za 
hrvatsku povijest, 10/1977., 395.-404.
55 Ibidem.
56 Lovorka »ORALI∆, “Senjani u Veneciji od 15. do 18. stoljeÊa” [=Settlers from Senj in Venice from the Fifteenth till 
the Eighteenth Centuries], SZ, 20/1993., 79.-102. ; L. »ORALI∆, “Iseljavanje stanovnika Modruπa i njihov æivot u 
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One of the possible answers to the Ottoman threat became a passive or active collaboration 
with the conquerors. This happened in cases when the endangered nobles estimated that the 
hardships of anti-Ottoman defense surpassed their capabilities of resistance, forcing them 
to try at least to protect their own estates from destruction. In 1481 somebody accused Ivan 
(John) Bevenjud, the chatelaine of the fortress of Krupa on the Una River, at the Slavonian 
noble diet in Zagreb, of supplying food to the Ottoman-held fortress of Kamengrad and helping 
the Ottomans to take Christian prisoners into slavery.57 In 1485 Count Petar Zrinski accused 
the Blagajski counts of collaborating with the Ottomans. He claimed that his officials recogni-
zed his sheep, stolen from him by the Ottomans, on the neighboring Blagajski estates. Count 
Petar requested their return, but the Blagajski refused to do so.58
It is difficult to estimate whether the accusations against the Blagajski were true. However, it 
does suggest that collaboration with the Ottomans was not at all unimaginable at that time in 
the region, even among the highest social strata. One has to emphasize that the accusations 
of collaboration were rather common during this period in medieval Croatia, as well as in the 
neighboring territories. They were particularly frequent in the diplomatic correspondence. In 
some cases such accusations were false, aimed at covering one’s own behavior or misdeeds. To 
accuse an adversary of collaboration with the Ottomans, for example, could serve as a strong 
argument for protecting somebody’s own material interests in front of the judicial authorities. 
The claims of Count Petar Zrinski could perhaps be interpreted as such an attempt. However, 
one has to bear in mind the fact that on some occasions the endangered magnates in the 
frontier regions really allowed the Ottomans to pass over their estates to attack neighboring 
territories, in order to spare their own possessions. The Venetian and imperial officials on 
many occasions accused Croatian magnates of allowing the Ottomans to pass through Croatia 
without interruption, enabling the latter to attack with full force the territories of the Empire 
and the Republic. One example of active collaboration is the alleged participation of Count 
Anæ (John) Frankapan Brinjski in an Ottoman raid on Carniola, in 1476.59 On another occasion 
the Ottoman negotiators discussed a possible surrender of the town of Modruπ with Count 
Bernardin Frankapan, in October 1494. Allegedly, the Blagajski had then already sworn an 
oath to the Ottomans, enabling the latter to travel without interruption through the counts’ 
estates. As well, the Ottomans imposed a yearly contribution on them.60 Although the events 
described here were from a somewhat later period, one has to bear in mind those claims while 
analyzing the earlier conflicts of the Blagajski with the Zrinski counts.
The Ottoman raids and incursions influenced to a great extent the everyday life in medieval 
Croatia, as well as in neighboring Slavonia and Dalmatia. The majority of sources only give 
concise data about the individual events, mainly about the concrete attacks and their immedi-
ate consequences. They speak much less about how the Croats perceived the aggression and 
the invaders and how the whole new situation influenced the thinking throughout Croatian 
society. However, one cannot negate the impression of difficult and tumultuous times. The 
Ottoman attacks had a direct and negative impact on the whole population, making the usual 
everyday activities year by year slower and more difficult to perform, creating chaos in the 
judiciary system and property issues. For example, in February 1475 a certain lesser noble 
Veneciji u 15. i u prvoj polovici 16. stoljeÊa” [=Emigrations of the Inhabitants of the Town of Modruπ and Their Life 
in Venice in the Fifteenth and the First Half of the Sixteenth Centuries], SZ, 21/1994., 79.-100.
57 V. KLAI∆, Povijest Hrvata, 154.
58 L. THALLÓCZY / S. BARABÁS, Codex diplomaticus comitum de Blagay, 399.-403.
59 V. KLAI∆, Povijest Hrvata, 128.
60 Ibidem, 239.
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Andrija (Andrew) from Varaædin (Varasd) County in Slavonia lost all his family’s property docu-
ments, running away from the Ottomans.61 In September 1488 the Ottomans prevented Pavao 
(Paul) KrnËiÊ, a chatelaine of the fortress of Obrovac on the Una River (today in Bosnia), from 
appearing in the town of BihaÊ, where the local magistrates summoned him.62 Such examples 
were frequent and common.
One cannot establish with certainty the exact proportions of human and material losses that 
the Ottoman incursions inflicted upon medieval Croatia. First of all, reliable statistics did not 
exist for the time. Besides that, many documents were lost during the turbulent centuries that 
followed. Despite that, one can suppose that human and material losses were substantial. The 
absolute figures of forces, killed, wounded, imprisoned, etc. on both sides are often exaggera-
ted. On the one hand they had a typical medieval literary function of impressing the readers 
with the importance of events. On the other hand, one could argue that the high figures on Cro-
atian side were partly expressing, as well, a widespread sense of fear and anxiousness among 
the Croats, created by Ottoman actions. Fiction and reality mixed and nurtured each other.63
Narrative sources, particularly the late medieval and Renaissance Croatian literature, are the 
basis for reconstructing the thinking and sensibilities of the population, due to the paucity 
and uniformity of non-narrative sources. The arrival of the Ottomans on the Croatian borders, 
which in turn resulted in a substantial threat for the very existence of Croatia and Croats, 
led to the creation of the so called “Turkish motif” in late medieval and Renaissance Croati-
an literature. This motif dominated during the second half of the fifteenth and the sixteenth 
centuries.64 The main centers of such literature were the Venetian-held Dalmatian towns and 
Dubrovnik. The authors frequently covered events in the broader hinterland area. The oldest 
such a text, entitled “The elegy of devastation at ©ibenik field”, probably appeared in 1477.65 In 
the introduction, the author Juraj (George) ©iægoriÊ deplores his own faith, which prevented 
him from writing poetry, because of the overall circumstances that hindered his efforts. In the 
second part of the elegy ©iægoriÊ described the Ottomans and briefly enumerated their conqu-
ests till then. The description of the Ottomans is loaded with stereotypes and what we would 
call today “hate literature”. These typical phrases are repeated in later numerous anti-Ottoman 
texts, speeches and reports.66 They could be justly interpreted as topoi, with the concrete task 
to provoke specific negative feelings against the “enemies” among the readers, serving in such 
way as a mobilizing force for the Christian side. On the other hand, one could analyze them 
even as an interesting testimony of how the Croatian and other intellectuals on the periphery 
of Catholic Europe perceived the essential otherness and diversity of the conquerors from the 
east. The so-called “total enemy” had to be absolutely and unconditionally demonized, which 
61 MOL - DL, no. 45598.
62 Radoslav LOPA©I∆, BihaÊ i BihaÊka krajina [=The Town and Region of BihaÊ], Zagreb 1890., 299.-300.
63 Tomislav RAUKAR, “Komunalna druπtva u Dalmaciji u XV. i u prvoj polovini XVI. stoljeÊa” [=The Communal Soci-
eties of Dalmatia in the Fifteenth and the First Half of the Sixteenth Centuries], HZ, 35/1982., 90.-92. ; T. RAUKAR, 
“Turci i hrvatsko kasnosrednjovjekovno druπtvo” [=The Turks and Croatian Late Medieval Society], HZ, 37/1984., 
252.
64 Ibidem, 249.
65 Vladimir GORTAN / Vladimir VRATOVI∆, Hrvatski latinisti [=Croatian Latin Poets], Zagreb 1969., (Pet stoljeÊa 
hrvatske knjiæevnosti, vol. 2.), 138.-143. On the other hand, Raukar claims that this text appeared perhaps in 1468, 
after the first major Ottoman raid into the hinterland of Zadar and ©ibenik. Tomislav RAUKAR / Ivo PETRICIOLI 
/ Franjo ©VELEC / ©ime PERI»I∆, Zadar pod mletaËkom upravom 1409-1797 [=The Town of Zadar under Veneti-
an Rule 1409-1797], Zadar 1987., 68., n. 113.
66 T. RAUKAR, “Turci”, 249.
Povijesni prilozi 23., 87.-104. (2002)
100
in turn could increase the cohesion and homogeneousness of the Christian, in this case Croa-
tian, society against the challenges and difficulties it was facing.67
The central part of ©iægoriÊ’s text, containing a description of the Ottomans destroying the vici-
nity of ©ibenik, is the most vivid and the most interesting part from the historical perspective.68
One can deduce from it the crucial role of the superior Ottoman cavalry in those attacks. As 
well, the general participation in the defense is clearly shown, engaging all the population of 
the endangered ©ibenik hinterland and neighboring medieval Croatia, namely warriors toget-
her with peasants and foreign mercenaries (archers) alike. The author gives a clear picture of 
the Ottoman tactics to burn down everything to the ground, thus destroying the resources and 
crippling the defense capability. The Ottomans burned crops, destroyed churches and other 
objects of religious cult, dragged people into slavery, tortured, beat, raped, etc.69 One of the 
charters written in the Zagreb cathedral chapter in January 1478, although not in a literary 
form, suggests an essentially similar picture regarding the Ottoman incursions in medieval 
Slavonia at approximately the same period.70
Texts of a similar kind written in medieval Croatia are more rare, at least those ones dating 
from the second half of the fifteenth century. The most important and well-known are surely 
the notes of a certain priest, Martinac (Martin), written in 1493, immediately after the Krbava 
field battle. He managed to describe briefly all the hardships that medieval Croatian lands 
had to endure, due to the fact that they were on the frontline of anti-Ottoman defense.71 After 
the fall of Greece, Bosnia, Bulgaria and Albania, claims Martinac, the Ottomans “came down 
on the Croatian tongue”.72 The battles on the open fields, in the mountains and near the river 
passes were innumerous. The Ottoman incursions reached Croatia, Slavonia and Carniola, all 
the way down to the Adriatic coast. Martinac, like ©iægoriÊ, described the gloomy reality. It was 
67 V. GORTAN - V. VRATOVI∆, Hrvatski latinisti, 141.
... Est genus invisum cunctis in partibus orbis,
Turcorum semper perfida turba fuit.
Vivit et hic populus Maomethis lege nephanda,
gens Alcorano credit et ipsa suo.
Est tamen huic generi fas ille vel ille cupido
fas Veneris crimen, fas Ganymedis amor.
Lex vetat his semper ferventis pocula Bacchi,
saepe tamen vino turba sepulta iacet.
Lex data, ne porcis utatur turba prophanis,
foedior est porcis Turchia turba tamen.
Dedita perpetuo et scevo gens dedita bello,
unica spes ferrum, parmula, cuspis, equus.
Gens inimica sacras ardescit perdere leges,
quas Deus electis fixit in orbe suis...
68 Ibidem, 141., 143.
69 Describing the Ottoman incursion into the hinterland of Dalmatian towns in 1468, which was perhaps the basis 
for ©iægoriÊ’s elegy, the Venetian authorities in a letter to the pope in Rome claimed that …tedet, miseretque 
referre cedes, rapinas et inauditas crudelitates, quas nuper ultra predam abactam ex agro nostro hiadertino, 
imanissimi Turci in agro Crovatie ad Scardonam usque excursantes igni et ferro omnia vastantes intulerunt. ©. 
LJUBI∆, Listine, 414.
70 ... inclitum quoque regnum nostrum cum omnibus circumvicinis terris, regnis ac provinciis gloriosissimis continuis 
eorumdem bestiarum bellicis incursibus pene attritum et compressum est adeo, ut iam maiori parte vastitati et 
desolacioni subactum, finale excidium prestoletur... Ivan Krstitelj TKAL»I∆, Povjestni spomenici slobodnog kra-
ljevskog grada Zagreba [=Monumenta historica liberae regiae civitatis Zagrabiae], vol. 2., Zagreb 1894., 385.
71 Vjekoslav ©TEFANI∆, Hrvatska knjiæevnost srednjega vijeka [=Croatian Medieval Literature], Zagreb 1969., (Pet 
stoljeÊa hrvatske knjiæevnosti, vol. 1.), 82.-84.
72 Note here the identification of Croats as an ethnic group with their own language.
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marked with looting, arson, sacrileges of all kinds, as well as dragging of young people, women 
and children into slavery.
The anti-Ottoman wars during the second half of the fifteenth century destroyed Croatian 
villages. Uncertainty and fear became the daily routine in all medieval Croatian lands. The Ot-
tomans inflicted serious damage upon them, particularly between 1470 and 1480. The political 
division between the Venetian and Hungarian-Croatian state territories did not mean anything 
in this context. The districts of the Dalmatian towns as well as the neighboring Croatian terri-
tories were equally badly hit.73 The period of “dismembering” of Croatia had thus been initia-
ted, as it was put with full justification in 1481 by the Croatian Glagolitic priest ©imun (Simon) 
KlimantoviÊ, in his comments on the death of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror.74
One might conclude that the Ottomans significantly influenced medieval Croatia during the 
second half of the fifteenth century in a variety of ways. Changes in politics, economy, society, 
demographics, everyday life and the thinking of Croats, throughout the period in question, 
show without exception a strong influence of the conquerors from the east. From the political 
perspective, the Ottomans succeeded in undermining the territorial integrity of medieval Cro-
atia, conquering the areas between the Cetina and Neretva rivers, namely the southeastern 
edges of the country. As an immediate consequence of the Ottoman incursions and raids was 
the gradual transfer of Croatian state and church centers and institutions to safer areas, from 
the south to the north. It ended in 1557, when Zagreb became the capital of Croatia and the 
permanent seat of the Croatian noble diet. This process was coupled with the ever-larger ex-
tension of the term Croatia, in a political sense, onto the neighboring regions of medieval Sla-
vonia. From 1476 onwards, for defense reasons, all medieval Croatian lands were placed under 
the control of one common banus. This fact enabled a stronger political integration between 
the kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia in the following period, as well as the rise of 
the importance and prestige of the Croatian ban in the Hungarian-Croatian kingdom. 
The Ottoman influence on the economy of medieval Croatia during the second half of the 
fifteenth century did not manifest itself in commercial relations and other forms of peacetime 
economy. On the contrary, the Ottomans were connected with the war events, being a princi-
pal cause of economic slow-down and difficulties in the wider area. The immediate effects of 
Ottoman raids into Croatia were destruction, huge material damage and insecurity in everyday 
life. The economic consequences were numerous, starting from problems in the organization 
of production on the landed estates, through the changes in form and size of feudal rents, to 
the weakening of the overall economic potential and the military and defense capabilities of 
the country. The Ottoman incursions significantly influenced on the way of life of the Croa-
tian population. The whole economy was gradually adapted to strengthening of the military 
component in the everyday life. The wartime economy gradually became the main source of 
income for the whole population during the sixteenth century. The beginning of all those ten-
dencies can be clearly traced to the second half of the fifteenth century.
The social changes in Croatia during this period occurred as a combined result of various 
factors. The Ottomans were an influence together with the royal power in Hungary and with 
the other neighboring countries, most of all Venice and the Empire. For the future social deve-
lopment in Croatia the most important fact was the decrease in power of the magnate families, 
such as the KurjakoviÊi and particularly the Frankapani. The battle with the Ottomans on the 
Krbava field, in 1493, significantly undermined the social position of the Croatian elite. It sped 
73 T. RAUKAR / I. PETRICIOLI / F. ©VELEC / ©. PERI»I∆, Zadar, 71.
74 Historija naroda Jugoslavije, 755. ; T. RAUKAR, “Druπtveni razvoj”, 78., n. 5., 83.
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up the already initiated processes of disintegration of its institutions, forms of social organiza-
tion, its cohesion, etc. Particularly hard hit were the lesser and the middle nobles on medieval 
Croatian soil, who almost disintegrated as social groups until the year 1527.
The Ottomans became the main factor for demographic changes in medieval Croatia. One has 
to emphasize, however, that till the end of the fifteenth century those changes were not as si-
gnificant as during the first half of the sixteenth century. As the Ottomans were conquering the 
medieval Croatian territories part by part, the population started to migrate to safer areas. The 
first ones to migrate were the peasants, whom the Ottoman raids deprived of any basis for fur-
ther existence in the old country. They were followed by lesser and middle nobles, particularly 
after the Krbava battle, while the magnates during this period remained in their seats, due 
to the strength of their fortified residences. The Croatian emigration in the fifteenth and the 
sixteenth centuries reached a very wide area, including the Italian Adriatic coast, particularly 
Marche and Venice, Istria, Burgenland, western Hungary, the area of Zagorje (in the hinterland 
of Zagreb) and other regions in medieval Slavonia. The most numerous were migrations to the 
Venetian-held Dalmatian towns and islands. In the evacuated areas of medieval Croatia, during 
the centuries that followed, the Ottoman, Habsburg and Venetian military authorities settled 
many newcomers of various ethnic, religious and social backgrounds.
Constant threats and fears of war, destruction and loss of freedom, together with all other 
forms of physical and psychological violence, marked everyday life in medieval Croatia. Those 
feelings became apparent after 1463. The Ottoman threat became, as well, the main motif of 
late medieval and early Renaissance Croatian literature. The chaos created in everyday life 
spread growing feelings of insecurity, fear and fragility, in some cases even pessimism and 
resignation in the face of the challenges that seemed to surpass the defense capabilities of 
medieval Croatian society. However, such feelings were throughout this and the following peri-
ods coupled with active armed resistance and many examples of individual and group bravery 
and audacity. The syndrome of society as a besieged fortress, created by constant clashes and 
wars from 1463 till 1791, spread to all social levels. It was aided by the concept of antemurale 
christianitatis, which revived the old ideology of the Crusades with its typically medieval war-
rior ethics and system of values. One cannot underestimate the importance of these facts on 
the current collective mentality of the Croatian population, as well as their relevance in the 
creation of modern national ideologies, myths, stereotypes, etc. It all started in Ottoman times, 
from the second half of the fifteenth century onwards.
Osmanski utjecaji na Hrvatsku u drugoj polovici 15. stoljeÊa
Hrvatska povijest u drugoj polovici 15. stoljeÊa obiljeæena je dolaskom Osmanlija na granice 
srednjovjekovnih hrvatskih zemalja. Nakon sporadiËnih upada u prvoj polovici 15. stoljeÊa, na-
padaËi s istoka su, napose nakon osvajanja srednjovjekovnog Bosanskog Kraljevstva 1463., po-
stali najvaæniji vanjski Ëimbenik za kasnosrednjovjekovnu Hrvatsku. U ovom radu analiziraju 
se razliËiti osmanlijski utjecaji na politiku, druπtvo, gospodarstvo i demografiju te njihov izraz 
u mentalitetima i svakodnevnom æivotu druge polovice 15. stoljeÊa u Hrvatskoj. Promjene na 
svim podruËjima druπtvenog razvoja nedvojbeno su pod znatnim utjecajem osvajaËa s istoka. 
S politiËkog motriπta Osmanlije su uspjeli potkopati teritorijalnu cjelovitost srednjovjekovne 
Hrvatske, osvojivπi podruËje izmeu Cetine i Neretve. Osmanlije su postali glavnim uzrokom 
gospodarske stagnacije i poteπkoÊa na πirem podruËju. Druπtvene promjene u Hrvatskoj tije-
kom tog razdoblja velikim su dijelom posljedica kombinacije utjecaja razliËitih vanjskih Ëim-
benika. Jedan od njih bili su i Osmanlije, uz ostale susjedne sile, poglavito Veneciju i Carstvo. 
Osmanlije su bili i glavni uzrok demografskih promjena. Ipak, treba naglasiti da te promjene 
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do kraja 15. stoljeÊa nisu bile toliko naglaπene kao πto Êe biti u prvoj polovici 16. stoljeÊa. 
Osmanlijska prijetnja postala je tada glavni motiv kasnosrednjovjekovne i ranorenesansne hr-
vatske knjiæevnosti. Kaos stvoren u svakodnevnom æivotu πirio je osjeÊaje nesigurnosti, straha, 
krhkosti i pesimizma. Katkad je Ëak vodio do rezignacije pred izazovima koji su se Ëinili pre-
jakima za obrambene sposobnosti druπtva. Ipak, takvi osjeÊaji u ovom i u narednom razdoblju 
mijeπali su se s djelatnim oruæanim otporom osvajaËima te brojnim primjerima pojedinaËne i 
grupne hrabrosti.
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